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Abstract. It is no surprise that the philosophy of religion, the many disciplines 
counted within the study of religion and theology, and religion-specifi c studies, 
all have their own methods and interests, and oft en proceed necessarily as 
conversations among small groups of experts. But the intellectual cogency and 
credibility of such studies also entails a problematization of the boundaries that 
divide them. While disciplinary distinctions are necessary and valuable, a freer 
fl ow of ideas and questions across boundaries is to the benefi t of all concerned. 
In particular, the philosophy of religion proceeds more fruitfully if, among 
its several dimensions, it is also intentionally comparative and interreligious, 
vulnerable to the questions raised by insiders to traditions, and open to the 
implications of ideas for religious practice.
I have never counted myself among those expert in the philosophy of 
religion, instead locating myself among those theologians who seek to 
understand their faith by detailed and rigorous study of the ideas and 
arguments presented in a religious tradition other than their own. 
Yet the comparative work I am interested in repeatedly places before 
me the philosophical and religious arguments of pre-modern Hindu 
intellectuals who oft en enough do not neatly separate philosophical and 
theological reasoning. And so I do turn occasionally to the state of the 
question regarding the philosophy of religion as a philosophical and 
religious discipline, with homes in both academe and amidst religious 
communities. 
It was therefore with great interest that I recently read William Wood’s 
essay, “On the New Analytic Th eology, or: Th e Road Less Traveled.”1 In it 
1 Journal of the American Academy of Religion (December 2009), Vol. 77, No. 4, 
pp. 941–960.
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he reviews several notable new volumes in the fi eld of analytic philosophy 
of religion and related theological disciplines.2 Wood also estimates the 
state of the fi elds wherein philosophy, theology, and the study of religion 
intersect; early on, he characterizes in this way the current standoff 
among philosophers, theologians, and scholars of religion:
Most scholars working in the religious studies academy have little use for 
analytic philosophy. Th ey tend to treat it with suspicion when they consider 
it at all, which is rarely. For their part, most analytic philosophers of religion 
return the favor by ignoring contemporary theology and continental philos-
ophy of religion, to say nothing of the other subdisciplines of religious stud-
ies. Many practitioners of religious studies believe that analytic philosophy 
of religion is merely a stalking horse for oppressive and antiquated forms 
of traditional Christianity. Conversely, analytic philosophers of religion of-
ten treat practitioners of religious studies as silly, unserious, uninterested 
in truth, and unwilling if not unable to appreciate that the rational case for 
traditional Christianity is actually quite strong. (942)
Lack of communication depends on justifi catory caricatures, and on 
narrow professional boundaries that encourage and reify the exclusion 
of other disciplines. But Wood also sees the irony in the fact that 
constructive religious refl ection fl ourishes quite apart from ordinary, 
seemingly wayward theological refl ection:
From a certain point of view, the entire situation is bizarre. On the one hand, 
what can only be called constructive theology, and of a very traditional sort, 
is currently fl ourishing in philosophy departments, in near total isolation 
from the actual academic discipline of theology. On the other hand, the ac-
tual academic discipline of theology remains fractured and embattled, un-
der attack from all sides, unsure of its place not only in the academy, but in 
churches and divinity schools as well. (942-3)
2 Including: A Reader in Contemporary Philosophical Th eology, edited by Oliver D. 
Crisp. New York: Continuum, 2009; Analytic Th eology: New Essays in the Philosophy 
of Th eology, edited by Oliver D. Crisp and Michael C. Rea, New York: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2009; Th e Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Th eology, edited by Th omas P. 
Flint and Michael C. Rea, New York: Oxford University Press, 2009; Oxford Readings in 
Philosophical Th eology, Vol. 1: Trinity, Incarnation, Atonement, and Vol. 2: Providence, 
Scripture, and Resurrection, both edited by Michael C. Rea. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2009.
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Near the end of the essay, Wood reminds us that we cannot take for 
granted as if settled any particular narrative regarding how reasoning 
stands in relationship to the goals of academic scholarship and religious 
refl ection:
[S]cholars who advocate a sharp distinction between theology and the study 
of religion fi nd themselves defending, if not quite disengaged reason, at least 
the scientifi c status of all genuine academic work in religious studies. Th at 
is, whether they accept or reject various claims about postmodernity, op-
ponents of postmodern theology continue to criticize it for failing to live 
up to the proper canons of rational inquiry in the academy. But down the 
hall from the department of religion, we fi nd another discipline, philoso-
phy, with sterling academic credentials and its own methodological norms, 
norms that do seem to legitimate exactly the practice that our own oppo-
nents of theology will not countenance—namely, the practice of making and 
assessing truth claims about God. (958)
Religion departments may be undercutting the credibility of religious 
beliefs, as if for the sake of autonomous judgments on religion, while 
the rigorous analysis of religious claims in philosophy departments may 
conversely make available persuasive defenses of religious beliefs.
Wood’s estimate of the situation is of course open to discussion and 
further nuance, but overall it rings true. More work needs to be done to 
remedy the stubbornly enduring and unproductive separation between 
philosophical discourse and intellectual refl ection within religious 
traditions and among practitioners, that we might get clearer about the 
relationship between reasoning about religious topics and the engaged 
religious reasoning practiced within the bounds of a faith perspective. 
From the vantage point of comparative theology,3 I suggest that we 
need also to break down the artifi cial boundary between reasoning 
about and from religious perspectives in the (Christian) West, and the 
similar forms of reasoning quite evident in other religious traditions. We 
still act as if geographical borders and specifi c histories excuse us from 
including in our conversations potential interlocutors in other traditions. 
Th e relation between the philosophy of religion and theology, between 
3 See Francis X. Clooney, SJ, Comparative Th eology: Deep Learning across Religious 
Borders (Wiley-Blackwell, 2010).
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such intellectual disciplines and religious practice as motivating and 
contextualizing thinking, and between Western Christian intellectual 
practices and those found elsewhere in the world, are more eff ectively 
tackled when addressed together.
To off er a modest contribution to the larger ongoing conversation, 
as the core of this essay I refl ect on yet another recent publication, 
Parimal Patil’s Against a Hindu God: Buddhist Philosophers of Religion 
in India, and from there trace a path of widening religious refl ection. In 
this 2009 monograph, Patil aims fi rst of all to get straight the Buddhist 
philosopher Ratnakirti’s critique of Hindu logicians’ arguments in favor 
of the existence of a creator god. Against the background of a general 
exposition of the epistemological framework of the argument about 
a world-maker — taken to be divine, i.e. God (Chapter 2), Patil explores 
Ratnakirti’s understanding of relation and pervasion (Chapter 3), key 
elements in the arguments on both the Buddhist and Hindu sides. He 
then considers the relevant Buddhist epistemology, particularly the 
logically and rhetorically important concept of “exclusion” (Chapter 4), 
and fi nally the structure of Ratnakirti’s Buddhist worldview as a whole, 
as implicit in the arguments (Chapter 5).
Th is is not an easy book, nor could it be. Even a reader already 
somewhat familiar with Indian dialectics must be ready for a heavy 
dose of technical detail and refi ned terminology. Although Patil strives 
for clarity, the arguments, rigorous and concisely delineated, remain 
daunting; but the technicalities serve clarity in argument and regarding 
the goals of argument, which otherwise lose cogency.4 
Although the book deals primarily with “the philosophical content 
of an interreligious debate between Buddhist and Hindu intellectuals 
in premodern India,” as argued by Ratnakirti, Patil is also interested 
in “moving beyond the usually historical and philological task of 
restating, in English, complex arguments formulated in Sanskrit.” (4) 
Th e demonstration that there is a broader intellectual accessibility such 
as commands our attention across cultural and religious boundaries is 
in fact key to Patil’s overall project. He wants to build bridges, so as to 
4 For example, the book is replete with coded abbreviations, e.g., C1, performance 
conditions; C2, instrument conditions/triple conditions; C3 argument conditions – and 
these as nuanced by a series of “H” distinctions: H1a, “unestablished in the site of infer-
ence”, H1b, “opposed,” that is, a “direct defeater,” and all the way to H5, “too late.”
FRANCIS X.  CLO ONEY,  SJ
115
enable interested and willing philosophers, particularly in the Western 
academy, to engage more substantively in refl ection on the arguments 
posed by Ratnakirti and his interlocutors. Patil off ers substantive 
analyses of such arguments in a conceptual framework that recognizes 
both indigenous Indian, and Western, modes of religious/philosophical 
argumentation. In this way, Patil is emphasizing the value of “thinking 
(in) Sanskrit,” even for readers who do not know the Sanskrit language 
and have not thoroughly mastered the technical terminology of Indian 
logic. Any of us, he suggests, can learn enough so as to begin to have in 
place ways of thinking about religious and philosophical issues that are 
indebted to India and not merely Western traditions applied to Hindu 
and Buddhist arguments.
To ground this mix of detail and epistemological reconsideration, 
Against a Hindu God models a transdisciplinary learning that draws on 
three sources — South Asian studies, philosophy, and study of religion. 
By means of this learning, Patil hopes to rethink the boundaries among 
these disciplines for the sake of a “new kind of philosophy of religions.” 
(6) Much of it has to do with a willingness to read, with care and patience. 
Patil scolds scholars of South Asian studies for infatuation with “the 
social, cultural, and political ‘outsides’ of texts.” Given the avid turn to 
contextual issues, it may seem as if texts are interesting primarily because 
of what can be wrested from them regarding context, insights into social, 
political and power concerns that, while relevant to interpretation, are 
simply not what the texts say and are about. He traces this attitude to 
“the tyranny of social and cultural history, and a closely related distrust 
of philosophy.” (6) Endemic too is a predilection for academic theories 
generated outside of India and then merely applied to Indian texts, as if 
such texts are meant to provide data by which to test Western theories 
about Hindus, Buddhists and their arguments. As Patil rightly reports, 
specifi c arguments from the Indian context, such as Ratnakirti and the 
Hindu logicians trade back and forth, do more than tell us something 
about social conditions and power constructions in premodern South 
Asia. Th ey get us to think oft en more rigorously and certainly diff erently, 
about issues of wide import and subject to debate in the West. For 
example: can it be shown that God exists? 
Patil robustly argues that the Indian debates, when taken seriously on 
internal grounds – in terms of what the texts say – are philosophically 
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interesting, and for that reason, remain pertinent centuries later. Indeed, 
they form “an intellectually available source from which we can learn today” 
regarding “the nature of rationality, the metaphysics of epistemology, and 
the relevance of philosophy to the practice of religion.” (4)
Stepping back from the details, Patil highlights four benefi ts of the 
approach he is defending. First, “focused attention on the philosophical 
content and signifi cance of Ratnakirti’s arguments will remind historians 
of religion of the importance of intellectual contexts to the study 
of religion.” And, I might clarify, not only the social contexts of texts 
matter, but also internal contexts, ideas. Second, philosophers of religion 
will be enabled to see the relevance of these Indian materials to their 
fi eld, and to move beyond an overly Christian-based set of “Christian 
texts and textual traditions.” (13) Th ird, the book will enable diligent 
and open-minded philosophers to begin to philosophize using Sanskrit 
materials oft en abandoned as accessible only to the specialist. Fourth, 
all of this will make evident that what is learned in South Asian studies, 
including philosophy, is of relevance to a much wider audience than 
those interested in India and South Asia. Ratnakirti and his interlocutors 
are philosophers, and of interest to the wider philosophical audience. 
(13-14)5
If all this adds up to an ambitious agenda, Patil is also interested in a still 
deeper and more robust defense of this philosophical argumentation as 
religiously informative. At the end of the volume he makes the interesting 
move of uncovering the pedagogical and religious dimensions of the 
Buddhist argumentation he has been studying. According to Jnanasrimitra 
5 Along the way, Patil also insists on a fresh approach to the comparative dimension 
of comparative philosophy. Th e project of studying Ratnakirti with these sensitivities and 
expectations is comparative because it brings together “two or more components that are 
generally taken to be diff erent” – from diff erent entities or “patients,” or “diff erent fea-
tures of a single, multivalent component, or both.” (22) Whenever an entity is studied in 
this expansive way, the study becomes a comparative one. It allows for “narrow” compar-
isons (dealing with historically related entities) and “broad” comparisons (which bring 
hitherto unrelated elements into a single refl ection). Th e model also allows for a very 
rich variety of exempla, since many diff erent kinds of entities can be compared, includ-
ing processes. (23) While this notion of comparison seems too broad – and liable to the 
uninteresting generalization that all learning is comparative – it neatly escapes any stan-
dard “Western-other” dichotomy, and so makes it at least seem noncontroversial that the 
preoccupations of the West regarding its own uniqueness are no longer interesting.
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(Ratnakirti’s teacher), advancement in proper argumentation is as it were 
the ascent of a ladder of ideas and insights, rising toward superior, fuller 
viewpoints; “the way that one learns to move up from rung to rung of 
this ladder is by discovering conceptual problems inherent in how we 
speak about awareness and its objects.” (350) Philosophy by this account 
“is of pedagogical signifi cance, since it is through philosophical analysis 
and argumentation that a teacher like Jnanasrimitra is able to help his 
‘students’ move up from rung to rung of a philosophical stepladder. . . [P]
hilosophy is supposed to change people’s minds by turning them away 
from their false or partially true views and toward those that are more 
correct.” (350) 
Buddhist argument with the Hindu logicians thus off ers valuable 
training in philosophy, but not only for the sake of establishing correct 
philosophical views; rather, in accord with Buddhist insight, the end result 
is also the defense of the correctness of the selfl essness-momentariness 
thesis, by which “Ratnakirti further identifi es selfl essness and the 
thesis that all existing things are momentary as the unique teachings 
of the Buddha, and thus . . . that they alone are the proper objects for 
meditation.” (331) Th is identifi cation is defended on the grounds of 
a proper epistemology and set of arguments about the self, a world-maker, 
etc. And all this is in turn propaedeutic to right practice, since “meditating 
upon selfl essness-momentariness can lead to omniscience — that is, the 
direct awareness of dharma itself.” (355) But this means that the technical 
Buddhist philosophical arguments are also relevant to our understanding 
of “Buddhism” as a religion, of which the selfl essness-momentariness 
thesis is the essential, distinguishing feature. Even as Ratnakirti is 
uncompromising in the rigor of his philosophical arguments, the overall 
structure of his discourse “is determined by both philosophical and 
soteriological concerns that are informed by Ratnakirti’s understanding 
of the Buddhist path.” (362) Or, to put it another way: Buddhist religious 
beliefs are relevant to a proper understanding and assessment of Buddhist 
philosophy. Soteriology and epistemology inevitably imply one another, 
each incomplete until the other is taken into account.
When vigorous arguments change minds, the way is opened to better 
and more effi  cacious religious practice. Th is opening is a goal implicit in 
the stated arguments, and it marks the direction in which the arguments 
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move for the sake of conclusions that are not only logical but also 
religious. So the philosophical and religious cohere:
[P]hilosophical activity, as a form of religious practice, improves one’s 
epistemic position with respect to a soteriological goal, by both removing 
one’s false views and fi xing the right views in one’s mind through very de-
tailed and deliberate philosophical analysis. Built into this work is the ex-
pectation that upon entering this new epistemic position, one will display 
the necessary epistemic rationality and accept Ratnakirti’s conclusions. On 
Ratnakirti’s model, religious reasoning is a “hybrid virtue” that requires that 
one be sensitive to both instrumental and epistemic reasons. (362)
Th is hybridity requires that we get right the intellectual context, the 
complexity of the words, concepts, and models of reasoning, such as will 
disclose the coherence of reasoning and word, faith and practice.
Yet if this more generously imagined religious philosophy of religion 
is to make sense, it must also be possible to go a step farther and still 
more forthrightly make room for judgments on truth. Patil does not go 
far in this direction; we notice that in listing four benefi ts of his approach, 
he does not add a fi ft h benefi t that would be highly signifi cant – that the 
study of these arguments sheds light on whether a God (a maker god, the 
Hindu God, or some other) can be said to exist. While Patil is articulate 
in describing what Buddhist intellectuals take seriously for philosophical 
and religious purposes, he does not say whether all of it adds up to more 
light shed on the question of God. But the logic of Against a Hindu God 
pushes us toward taking very seriously the question whether God does 
exist, and motivates us to say more about who that God might be. 
So do Buddhist arguments against the notion of a world-making 
divinity make it less reasonable to believe today that God exists? Are 
the Hindu logicians right in making the case for the divinity whom 
believers address as Visnu, Siva, or by another name? And if there are 
good reasons for the existence of Visnu, does this count for or against the 
existence of the Christian God? While a large number of questions surely 
intrude here, my point is that the overall direction of the philosophy 
of religion is toward taking seriously direct questions about God, even 
toward answering them affi  rmatively. 
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Th e second chapter of my Hindu God, Christian God6, “Arguing the 
Existence of God: From the World to Its Maker,” is the closest I come in my 
own writing to a reasonably full treatment of a philosophical argument 
about God’s existence.7 I wrote this book in order to show how the great 
theological issues that have occupied the Christian West have serious 
and apt counterparts in traditional Hindu theology,8 and consequently 
that there is no good reason for theologians serious about such issues to 
restrict their attention to Western and Christian sources. 
In this second chapter, I deal with the existence of God as a key topic 
in the philosophy of religion, addressing a version of the same debate 
over the existence of God that Patil treats more thoroughly in his book. 
Like Patil, though much more briefl y, I draw on Buddhist and Hindu 
arguments, and I also draw some parallels to the Christian tradition of 
the philosophy of religion, represented in this chapter by the work of 
Richard Swinburne. From personal motives (as a practicing Catholic) 
yet also for good reasons, in the chapter I entertain the view that it is 
more rather than less probable that there is a God who exists and, in 
divine perfection and with perfectly good intent, creates the world. 
Th is view remains plausible even if, the Buddhist critique aside, we also 
fi nd in both the Hindu and Christian traditions that there have been 
important thinkers, devout theists included, who did not believe that an 
adequate case for the existence of God could be made and satisfactorily 
defended. In this project, I took arguments about God’s existence to form 
a necessary starting point – conceptually, if not temporally – for whatever 
else one might wish to say about God deeper within the specifi c confi nes 
of individual traditions. 
Yet, although I had originally imagined that my book would have 
been concerned solely with the issues arising in the debates about 
God’s existence, even in chapter two I gave space to Hindu scriptural 
6 Hindu God, Christian God (Oxford University Press, 2001) – to which Patil wrote 
a concluding response.
7 See also “Th e Existence of God, Reason, and Revelation in Two Classical Hindu 
Th eologies,” Faith and Philosophy 16/4 (2000) 523-543.
8 Th e four main chapters of Hindu God, Christian God (Oxford University Press, 
2001): c. 2, on the existence of God, beginning with Richard Swinburne, then moving to 
Hindu materials; c. 3, on God’s proper identity, beginning with Hans Urs von Balthasar; 
c. 4, on whether God can become embodied, beginning with Karl Rahner; c. 5, on wheth-
er revelation tells us defi nitively who God is, beginning with Karl Barth. 
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theologians (in the Mimamsa and Vedanta traditions) who do not believe 
that the demonstration of God’s existence can ever work perfectly, while 
in its imperfect form it may cause doubts that are harmful. To an extent, 
I share that skepticism; something more than logic and appeals to natural 
instances of cause and eff ect are required if we are to think cogently about 
God.
But does concern for the question of God, as a real question with 
real implications, require faith? We ought not to slip too casually from 
the land of philosophy into a world of believers. Not that this would 
necessarily be a bad thing, even for rigorous philosophers. While the 
contemporary academy has for a long time had an ambition toward an 
objectivity that keeps its distance from faith, its practicing communities 
and its authorities, the reasons for this distance no longer add up 
to an absolute separation. If Patil is right, then the turn to religious 
engagement, including faith and practice, is occurring at the heart of 
rigorous arguments about religion, particularly when substantive classical 
materials are taken seriously. Th e split that Wood has highlighted now 
seems all the more problematic, since good philosophical arguments 
(“from the outside”) and good religious arguments (“inside”) all the 
more obviously imply one another. 
In Hindu God, Christian God I was therefore also interested in 
additional diffi  cult issues that arise when more specifi c, positive features 
of religious belief become topics of intellectual relevance. In the third 
chapter, for example, I turned to the issue of God’s proper, specifi c name 
– Siva or Narayana or the God of our Lord Jesus Christ, for example 
– and the very conditions under which God can be convincingly 
recognized by one right name. While inevitably religious, the issue is 
also philosophically challenging, as the philosophical arguments, already 
diffi  cult enough, are further complicated by decisions about whether and 
how reason and experience favor one specifi c understanding of God and 
one religious practice over another. 
Such arguments, Hindu or Christian, entail claims about truths that 
have universal import, even while remaining in other ways tradition-
specifi c. In Chapter 3 I was therefore dealing with arguments posed 
by Hindu and Christian thinkers who insist that there are reasons for 
the specifi city of divine identity announced in their faith traditions. In 
examining Hindu arguments about whether Visnu or Siva is the supreme 
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deity properly named, I suggested that these arguments stand parallel to 
Hans Urs von Balthasar’s arguments in favor of Jesus Christ as the sole 
completely full and true manifestation of God properly known. In either 
the Hindu context or the Christian, proponents of naming God in “just 
this way” know very well that reason alone will not suffi  ce for a compelling 
case determinative of who God is. Yet they still made arguments, and saw 
that without risking this extended and more vulnerable argumentation, 
the mere claim that God exists would remain empty.
In the fourth and fi ft h chapters of Hindu God, Christian God, I dealt 
with still more narrow specifi cations, taking up arguments that this God 
can become incarnate (c. 4), and that God can be reliably and specially 
revealed in specifi c scriptural texts (c. 5). Each chapter by plan demands 
more of readers, insofar as it involves still narrower commitments to 
specifi c ways of arguing that entail still more rigorous religious and 
philosophical tenets. Th us, the idea of incarnation will not be accepted 
by Muslim or Saiva theists, and the idea that sacred texts (oral, written) 
aff ord reliable encounter with and information about God will put off  
other believers, and not just those who adhere to one scripture while 
excluding all others. 
Th is increasingly narrowed set of interests of course raises the bar 
for participants, even as it leaves less comfortable space for philosophers 
whose sentiments, personal or professional, run against treating the 
particularities of specifi c faith traditions as of compelling intellectual 
relevance. Th is process of edging deeper into religious particularities 
and scriptural exegesis makes it unlikely that philosophically neutral 
arguments will be decisive; it also narrows the conversation to the smaller 
group of religious intellectuals willing to take seriously factors other than 
reason. In turn, attention to scripture also makes it relevant to refl ect on 
a still wider range of learning practices that aff ord to religious truths 
a more demanding cogency. Even if Patil is right in arguing that the truth 
of arguments is not merely community-specifi c, the way to get at the 
larger cogency and universal meaning arises through attention to “local” 
detail, to those specifi cs on which religious traditions in the end do not 
yield. Yet if this line of reasoning has some force to it, the obligation goes 
both ways. Logical arguments about God open up properly religious 
topics; religious arguments are weaker if reasoned argumentation is 
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left  to skeptics and opponents, while believers rush too quickly to safer 
religious resources that have little or no force with outsiders. 
Once we open the door to tradition-specifi c religious arguments, 
we can ask whether there is anything to be gained by stating that this 
philosophical and religious refl ection is itself a mode of religious 
activity. I believe that there are advantages, provided we do not 
overdo the correlation or insist that every individual thinker must be 
explicitly religious. It is better to move forward cautiously; Patil’s case 
for the relevance of arguments about God and related matters will be 
strengthened if we become willing to speak of certain forms at least of 
the philosophy of religion as religious practices that are most naturally 
rooted in traditions of practice, even as forms of theological or religious 
reasoning. 
A viable starting point for this further consideration is the well 
known “way of spiritual exercises” proposed by Pierre Hadot. Although 
Patil refers to Hadot only once, in passing and with a certain hesitation 
(p. 362), he does helpfully refer us to Matthew Kapstein’s Reason’s Traces,9 
wherein Kapstein, himself a distinguished scholar of Buddhism, points 
to close parallels between Hadot’s understanding of philosophy and 
that of Buddhist intellectuals who care about religion and argument 
both. Kapstein argues that “Buddhist philosophy” is in some ways more 
precisely “Buddhology,” “the hermeneutics of buddhahood and of the 
message propounded by the Buddha.” (19) Th is Buddhology proceeds 
with a care for revealed teachings that does not sit well with conceptions 
of philosophy as autonomous; indeed, it is plausible to argue that 
“Buddhist philosophy has never claimed for itself the perfect autonomy 
of reason that is oft en supposed to be a hallmark of the Western 
traditions of rational inquiry derived ultimately from the Greeks.” (19) 
Kapstein, like Patil, shows how the study of Buddhist thought might now 
be undertaken “not only for interreligious refl ection on arguments and 
practices elaborated in the past, but in considering also our unactualized 
prospects . . . in critical refl ection on its ideals of the good in relation 
to our contemporary predicaments.” (20) I infer that Kapstein supports 
the model proposed by Hadot: Buddhist (or Hindu or Christian) 
9 Specifi cally, the Introduction, pp. 3-26, in Reason’s Traces: Identity and Interpreta-
tion in Indian and Tibetan Buddhist Th ought (Wisdom Publications, 2002).
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philosophizing is a spiritual exercise that foregoes the ideal of total 
autonomy. But if so, understanding adequately the Buddhist arguments, 
or Western and Christian arguments with which they are paired, requires 
that one must be prepared to reconceptualize one’s intellectual practice 
as a spiritual inquiry. And this means that we need to pay attention to 
our practices even as we attend to theirs, and speak with some candor 
about what our predicaments are. Th is richer philosophy of religion 
becomes in a way actually confessional, a discourse rooted in tradition 
and even normally understood as arising from and for communities of 
faith, alongside a similarly intended group of academic colleagues and 
interlocutors.10 
To some readers, when I reconceive the philosophy of religion 
as a spiritual practice with confessional characteristics, I will seem to 
have traveled too far from what real philosophers of religion think the 
discipline to be. But I do so because in this way I fi nd myself on surer 
ground, where I can think better, thinking religiously. Indeed, I have 
recently11 tried out this still more deeply engaged thinking, by taking up 
the topic of “loving surrender to God” as argued and presented in two 
classics of spiritual theology, the Treatise on the Love of God by Francis 
de Sales and the Essence of the Th ree Mysteries by Vedanta Desika. Both 
de Sales and Desika, classical theologians, think through carefully the 
potential and limits of reasoning in spiritual matters, while arguing for 
continuity between clear-sighted reasoning about self and world on the 
one hand, and the necessarily interior journey that begins but does not 
end in reason’s hard questions. I found their work attractive because I was 
interested in pushing still farther the matter of how religious intellectuals 
write so as to draw their readers into religious activities, such as surrender 
to God, that stand at the heart of their traditions. Reason and argument 
have their role, but employing them properly — chastened, literate, aware 
of their resting point — raises the prospect of actual religious practice. 
Patil made this point with respect to Ratnakirti’s project; my contribution 
is to argue that I really do intend also an existential event, that a reader 
might be persuaded actually to surrender to God. 
10 On my understanding of “confessional” as a characteristic of comparative theologi-
cal discourse, see Hindu God, Christian God, c. 1.
11 Beyond Compare: St. Francis de Sales and Sri Vedanta Desika on Loving Surrender 
to God (Georgetown University Press, 2008). 
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For now, the relationship among the philosophy of religion, theology, 
and engaged religious reasoning remains uncomfortable and vexed, 
but more intimate and intense conversations that violate disciplinary 
boundaries promise to be so fruitful that no one involved should neglect 
the opportunity to take the other modes of reasoning seriously. As Patil 
shows us in splendid detail, the densest and most exact of arguments is 
still made clearer by catching its religious fi nality; deeper and engaged 
religious refl ection is never relieved of the need for exact, even detached 
reasoning; as Kapstein’s refl ection on Hadot tells us, Buddhist (and other) 
forms of arguments can rightly be recognized as spiritual exercises. All of 
this needs to be formalized, of course, but Wood states the balance well 
in the last paragraph of his essay:
It would be a good thing if more scholars of religion—and especially theo-
logians—read analytic philosophy. Moreover, theologians who want more 
scholars of religion to read theology ought to agree. So also scholars of re-
ligion who want more theologians to read Marxist and Freudian critiques, 
or wrestle with non-Christian religions, or with social scientifi c approaches 
to religion. And for the same reasons, too—there are good arguments there, 
arguments worth taking seriously, even if one ultimately rejects them. We 
profi t intellectually when we engage with the interdisciplinary other. Th is is 
a truism of the religious studies academy, itself inherently interdisciplinary. 
So too with the analytic other. (959)
Wood should agree that the “ought” runs the other way too. By the 
obligation of their own commitments to reason, practitioners of analytic 
philosophy need to take seriously positive, tradition-based theology, 
including the serious but diffi  cult thinking that occurs in other terms 
in other religious traditions. None of the disciplines at stake is suffi  cient 
without taking the others into account. 
I close by reemphasizing that all of this is interreligious. In all such 
study, refl ection proceeds by way of complex learning with respect 
to multiple dimensions; even more broadly, religious and cultural 
boundaries are less than absolute because they do not make sense, are not 
productive, and are in fact crossed repeatedly. In turn, there will be no 
reason to privilege exclusively any single tradition’s manner of reasoning 
or scriptures or tradition of great teachers. 
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We are not just talking about good academic work, nor about 
a sensitized inclusion of Asian and southern hemisphere thinkers in our 
philosophical projects. Our disciplines will be intellectually compelling 
insofar as false boundaries are not imposed. Insofar as truth is at stake, 
the very content of our disciplines will unsettle conventional divisions 
between philosophical and religious modes of refl ection.
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